


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WEST GERMANY - EAST GERMANY: Pankow tabled a new draft basic treaty when the Bahr-Kohl talks resumed on 16-17 August, but it contained no concessions on the issues of most importance to Bonn.

The behavior of both sides at the talks--now official negotiations--indicates they are well aware they are performing against the backdrop of a West German election campaign. The Warsaw Pact states have been signaling that they plan to help Brandt's candidacy. Kohl's new draft contained a reference to the German state's right of self-determination, a nod in Bonn's direction. Kohl apparently attempted to appear flexible in the talks by suggesting that West Germany could make some kind of unilateral declaration "regarding the question of the nation," a central point of difference between the two sides. In a joint press conference following the session, Kohl pledged that the East Germans will "do our best" to conclude the negotiations successfully by the end of the year.

Bahr appears to have held to Bonn's previous positions. Along with many other West German officials, he appears hopeful that Moscow will push the East Germans into major concessions, but in conversation with US officials he admitted that it was possible the Soviets had an interest in delay, adding that, although the atmosphere of the talks has improved, East German interests require Kohl to bargain tenaciously and "do not rule out the possibility" of failure. Both Bahr and Brandt are anxious to avoid any impression of haste, and Brandt in a television interview on 17 August urged the Pact states not to hold up normalizing relations with Bonn until the inter-German negotiations are concluded.

Bonn's position also has elements of flexibility. A Foreign Office official indicated on 15 August that Bonn will probably accept Pankow's argument that the treaty should not settle such issues.

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as reunification of families and travel improvements, issues particularly sensitive for East Germany. However, Bonn's attitude will probably remain basically conservative. Any treaty concluded during the campaign will be controversial, and a treaty difficult to defend would be more dangerous for the government than no treaty at all.

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